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Abstract
This paper reports on further research undertaken regarding systems modelling as applied to critical infrastructure 
systems and networks and builds upon the initial modelling research of Pye and Warren (2006a).  We discuss  
system characteristics, inter-relationships, dynamics and modelling of similar systems and why modelling of a  
critical infrastructure is important. In overview we compare four modelling methods and techniques previously 
used to model similar systems and discuss their potential transference to model critical infrastructure systems, 
before selecting the most promising and suitable for modelling critical infrastructure systems for further research. 
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INTRODUCTION
The  nature  of  critical  infrastructure  systems  and  their  interconnection  display  the  characteristics  of  highly 
structured, complex and highly interconnected networks that  also have the added issues of dependency and 
interdependency relationships that necessarily exist between infrastructures to facilitate the supply of services. 
This  is  particularly  prevalent  when  considering  the  energy  sector,  where  the  continuity  of  the  supply  of 
electricity for example, is crucial to many other sectors of critical infrastructure for ongoing provision of services 
to the community at large (Scott 2005).
However, critical infrastructures are vulnerable and can be damaged, destroyed or disrupted by breakdowns, 
negligence, natural disasters, accidents, cyber incidents, illegal criminal activity and malicious damage to name a 
few, and for this reason the continuity of supply must be protected against such hazards, threats, vulnerabilities 
and risks. Therefore the aim of government policy and by association that of infrastructure owners and operators, 
is to ensure continued supply availability through identifying and implementing improved protective safeguards 
and analysis in response to the identified threats and risks posed (Scott 2005).
The focus of this paper is that in order to address, analyse and determine system vulnerabilities effectively. It is 
apparent that such system analysis requires the initial modelling of the system, possibly at a number of scalable 
levels of infrastructure that not only mimic normal operation, but also enable the modelling of prognosticative 
outcomes, as a consequence of deviations from normal functionality whether they are internally or externally 
based influences or a combination thereof. 
At the outset this paper will focus on establishing the characteristics of a system, discuss systems thinking before 
proceeding to discuss the characteristics of critical infrastructure systems and how this relates to systems and 
systems thinking. The next aspect will focus on the rationale behind the modelling of such systems and the issues 
surrounding  the  modelling  of  critical  infrastructures  together  with  identifying  the  functional  and  relational 
dynamics at play internally and externally to the system/s.  Finally a brief  assessment of the potential value 
offered  by  various  security  system modelling  and  simulation  development  products  will  be  undertaken  to 
determine which is potentially best suited to the modelling and development of computer simulations that best 
mimic critical infrastructure function. This critique should also include the potential not only to model normal 
critical infrastructure operations, but also model artificial deviations from the norm so that identification and 
testing of security risks and their possible adverse ramifications can be undertaken and determined prior to 
physical implementation into the particular critical infrastructure system.
WHAT IS A SYSTEM?
The perception of what constitutes a system evokes different meanings and conceptual visualisations to different 
individuals,  depending  on  their  interpretation  of  the  system  characteristics  and  the  physical  or  inferential 
complexity of the components that may interact together to form the basis of a functional system representation. 
Such systems can take the form of biological, ecological, social, mechanical and natural (e.g. the solar system) 
that assist in performing routine functions. Furthermore systems can be comprised of sub-systems, for instance 
our work can consist of a number a sub-systems relating particularly to human, economic, technical, legal and 
social systems that can act individually, be influential or interact with each other (Maani & Cavana 2000). 
In seeking a general understanding of what commonalities indicate a system we can characterise that a system is 
a collection of smaller parts that cooperate with one another to function as a whole. Of course a system is not 
only the sum of its parts, but is also a representation of its  interactions and furthermore a system can also 
associate its own parts to itself and thereby become part of an even larger system (Maani & Cavana 2000).
As a consequence of these commonalities we can begin to investigate systems further to develop an appreciation 
of how the sub-systems and their parts all interact together in order to function collectively as a whole, but for 
this to eventuate the investigator has to utilise the paradigm of ‘systems thinking’ [sic] to truly appreciate the 
system as a whole consisting of many parts. 
Systems Thinking
Systems’ thinking remains an emergent discipline dedicated to understanding the complexity that is intrinsic 
within all systems, irrespective of size, natural and the influence of change upon the system and regardless of 
whether it is internally or externally located. As a paradigm, systems’ thinking is about describing the dynamics 
of  relationships  between  the  lessor  parts  within  system and  also  the  dynamics  of  relationships  with  other 
associated systems as a whole. 
As a consequence, systems’ thinking requires the investigator to consider thinking of systems in the following 
three ways (Maani & Cavana 2000):
• Dynamic  thinking  is  appreciating  that  the  world  is  not  static  and  that  things  are  changing 
constantly;
• Operational thinking is the cognitive condition of understanding the physics of operations and 
how things really work;
• Closed-loop thinking is recognising that cause and effect are not always linear and that the end 
(effect) can influence the means (cause).
Of  course this  is  not  as  easy as  it  may first  appear  when you consider  the  implications  of  larger  systems 
interacting with other large systems and that each in themselves contain numerous sub-systems all interacting 
within the boundaries of their own system. Additionally, this complexity exacerbates further when considering 
the influential relationships that can potentially exist between large systems as well as within the sub-systems 
making up these larger systems too. All this information is at  best difficult  for humans to comprehend and 
process in small relatively simple systems, let alone contemplating large complex and multiple systems together. 
This  is  where  systems  modelling  can  assist  us  with  enhancing  and  developing  a  greater  appreciation  and 
understanding of the functionality of the focal system/s, their sub-systems and inter-relationships.
Systems Modelling
To analyse  and  comprehend  the  functional  behaviour  of  any  system,  at  any  level  within  the  system,  it  is 
beneficial to our ultimate comprehension that we can initially model it. By modelling the system we can begin to 
understand the structure of the system, the interconnection between its elements or components, the relational 
influences and how localised change can affect the whole system and its lower level components over time. 
Once we can achieve this, then we can begin to manipulate the model to an extent where it becomes possible to 
potentially measure and predict possible systems behaviour in response to our manipulation based on attempts to 
imitate the precursor influences that lead to eventual system change (Maani & Cavana 2000).
When we consider the system from the previous perspective, we are essentially modelling a system that exhibits 
change and thereby the influence of ‘cause and effect’ [sic]. Therefore, this example requires applied system 
thinking in relation to and consideration of, modelling the dynamic characteristics inherent within the system or 
external to the system, where a cause (system influence) has a potentially different effect each time on the means 
of how the system responds, changes or reacts. Hence in this context, the overriding characteristic is that the 
system is not behaviourally static in reproducing the same repeatable result, but dynamic in the sense that the 
result can be infinitely variable and thus modelled with this consideration in mind.
Similarly, critical infrastructure systems also exhibit dynamic behaviour and characteristics. Therefore, to model 
such systems, the focus of this ongoing research, we have to consider the dynamics characterised by the system 
and  how  modelling  techniques  can  be  applied  precisely  that  represent  a  theoretical  account  that  is  truly 
representative  of  the  dynamic  characteristics  inherent  in  the  physical  critical  infrastructure  system and  its 
subsequent behavioural responses.
MODELLING SYSTEMS DYNAMICS
Modelling systems that exhibit dynamic behaviour requires the consideration of a number of issues. In general 
terms a dynamic system is one where its parts are interrelated in such a manner that a change in part of the 
system,  by  consequence  affects  other  parts  of  the  system  and  therefore  the  overall  system  as  a  whole. 
Furthermore, not only can the system be functionality influenced by internal changes, it is also susceptible to 
influence from external changes in environmental factors surrounding the system or other existing systems, via 
feedback. 
Feedback and System Dynamics?
This premise of system dynamics reflects the description provided by the System Dynamics Society (2006) that 
describes system dynamics as a method of studying and modelling complex response systems that are apparent 
in any sort of feedback equipped system. Feedback is the situation where via a chain of ‘cause and effect’[sic], X 
influences Y, which in-turn influences X and therefore the study of the link X and Y cannot be undertaken 
independently, as it is the link between X and Y that predicts how the system will behave. With this in mind, 
only the study of the whole system as a feedback system will lead to the appropriate systematic conclusions for 
modelling purposes.
Therefore to construct a useful interpretation or model a dynamic system as described requires an analysis of the 
system  to  develop  a  useful  understanding  of  the  system  situation  through  elaboration,  exploitation  and 
interpretation of a simulation model, which is heavily reliant on the mental interpretation of the developer. Here 
a useful interpretation refers to a given understanding of the system situation at a given moment together with 
the perceived mental structure of the whole system (Schaffernicht 2006). 
It is these system characteristics and modelling issues that when applied to critical infrastructure systems reflect 
the  similarities  of  system  constructs,  components  and  dynamic  behavioural  characteristics  of  critical 
infrastructure  systems.  These  principles  of  influential  relational  characteristics  closely  reflect  the  dynamic 
behaviours of both dependency and interdependency relationships as previously identified by Pye and Warren 
(2005) in regard to modelling critical infrastructure systems. This was further expanded upon by Pye and Warren 
(2006a) where the relationships between selected critical infrastructures was modelled to indicate there is a need 
to supply or exchange services that are crucial to the whole critical infrastructure system’s continued normal 
function.
Critical Infrastructure System Characteristics
According to Australia’s national strategy, critical infrastructure is defined as “those physical facilities, supply 
chains,  information  technologies  and  communication  networks  which,  if  destroyed,  degraded  or  rendered 
unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact upon the social or economic well-being of the 
nation or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security” (AGD p1 2004a).
Furthermore, by its very structure critical infrastructure systems are interconnected and networked together as 
necessary for the supply and demand of services to and from each other in varying degrees. It is this structural 
inter-relationship  between  critical  infrastructure  systems  and  the  internal  components  within  them,  which 
characterises critical infrastructure as a dynamic system made up of smaller independent or reliant systems. As a 
consequence, critical infrastructure systems can be further characterised as dynamic systems because they are 
highly reliant on each other and by necessity must function together in a cooperative manner so that the system 
as a whole, can function and supply the services normally expected (Pye & Warren 2006b). 
Another intrinsic characteristic of critical infrastructure systems as a whole, is the ‘unboundedness’ [sic] of the 
component  systems  that  are  related  or  networked  together  to  form  a  larger  functioning  system.  This  is 
characterised by the distributed nature of local system administrative control that  exists without any central 
governing  authority.  An  unbounded  environment  cannot  be  partitioned  into  a  number  of  finite  bounded 
environments because of the lack of global perspective given to the associated cooperating systems beyond the 
boundary of their local system, consequently there is a lack of the ‘big picture’ [sic] information represented 
locally, in regard to feedback from the system as a whole (Ellison et al 1999). 
From this we can draw the inference that indeed crtical infrastructure sytems do display similar characteristics to 
that  of  dynamic  systems  because  they  consist  of  multiple  variables  with  dynamically  changing  values, 
dependency  relationships  existing  between  and  within  infrastructure  systems  and  they  exhibit  network 
connection charateristics that are subject to both internal or externl change and influences. This necessiatates that 
in the national interest critical  infrastructure systems do need to be modelled as part of the overall security 
analysis process and assessed to determine points of weakness or areas of vulnerability.  The modelling and 
functional computer simulation of critical infrastrucutre systems is potentially the most appropriate and perhaps 
cost effective way to manage this process, along with solution development and testing of solution models prior 
to physical implementation into critical infrastructure systems.
Why Critical Infrastructure Modelling is Important 
From a systems dynamics perspective there is a strong logic that offers potential improvements in the analysis, 
security, functional understanding and strategic management perspectives of critical infrastructure systems that 
will  assist  in  understanding  the  performance  of  the  system and  variations  over  time  (Warren  2005).  Since 
performance reflects the state of resources or service provision, steering strategies can be developed and tested 
with system modelling, prior to developing policies, physical implementation and taking security decisions that 
address variations from normal functionality in the face of unexpected challenges. 
With  this  in  mind  it  is  then  quite  feasible  to  develop  adverse  scenarios  that  could  be  applied  to  critical 
infrastructure models to represent such threats and vulnerabilities that would impinge upon business continuity, 
incident  and  consequence  management,  information  system  attacks  and  vulnerabilities,  electronic  crime, 
protection of key sites from attack or sabotage, chemical, biological and radiological threats to water and food 
supplies  and the  identification and protection of  offshore and maritime assets,  accident  management,  cyber 
incidents  to  name  a  few  scenarios  that  could  reasonably  be  developed  and  applied  to  models  of  critical 
infrastructure (AGD 2004b).
Therefore, by applying modelling techniques to the critical infrastructure systems that everyone takes for granted 
such  as:  communication  networks;  banking;  energy;  water  and  food  supplies;  health  services;  emergency 
services and transport  networks (DPMC 2004) for example: this provides the opportunity to actually model 
adverse situations as applied to the critical infrastructure system, without necessarily testing this same adverse 
scenario situation in the physical realm of the infrastructure itself. 
Inevitably, people confronted with the undertaking of exercising control over dynamic systems, be they business 
production  systems,  the  economy,  global  warming  and  in  this  case  critical  infrastructure  management  for 
example. They are still required to deal with what Jensen and Berndt (2003) describe as ‘dynamic decision 
issues’ [sic] that characterise a series of related decisions where invariably the systems/s situation will change 
both in itself and in the response to the actions taken. Modelling of the dynamics at play within the system 
enables not only the normal functionality to be observed, but also the functionality of an adverse change and its 
effect upon the critical infrastructure system as a whole, for without this knowledge owners and operators of the 
critical infrastructure will remain severely handicapped and ill prepared for whatever may potentially eventuate 
(Warren 2005).
MODELLING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
The effective modelling of critical infrastructure would enable both the government and critical infrastructure 
owners to analyse, identify and effectively manage and maintain the security, stability and availability of their 
particular critical infrastructure through the development of solutions and contingencies against unexpected or 
otherwise challenges to the systems’ stability (Pye & Warren 2006a).
Here we will briefly examine four different modelling methods and their potential to address the primary issue of 
effectively  representing  the  modelling  of  critical  infrastructure  systems  to  critically  represent  the  existing 
physical  nature  of  the infrastructure  system within the  modelling scope.  Also incorporating  its  dependency 
relationships to other associated infrastructures, within the boundaries set by the model developer and whether 
such modelling techniques as applied justifiably represent the dynamics of the system being modelled and if it is 
applicable, adaptable or transferable to critical infrastructure modelling.
The EASEL Way 
EASEL (Emergent  Algorithm Simulation  Environment  and  Language)  is  a  beta  version  software  program 
designed for the ‘simulating, depicting, and gathering information about networks, software agents, and other 
active entities of the physical, electronic and software worlds, about their interactions, and about their collective 
global effects’ (Fisher p1 1999) of real-world systems upon which the EASEL simulation is modelled. 
EASEL is a script language that utilises property-based types to define the various entities (actors) that can be 
created by the language and its strength lays in its capability to model, depict and model unbounded systems and 
simulate the complex interactions that take place between the various types of entities within the system being 
modelled (Redman et al 2005). Additionally, the software is still freely available online for download from the 
Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon, but current support and development of the EASEL software 
itself seems to have lapsed (SEI 2006).
Redman’s (2003) research into system survivability noted that the use of EASEL as a simulation development 
tool  had  some  performance  limitations  during  the  design  and  development  of  his  survivability  simulation 
research project. Principally the software was only available in the Apple Macintosh operating system platform 
and because the software was still in the ‘beta’ [sic] development, there was a lack of resources to support the 
developer or instruction to easily produce a simulation using the EASEL software. Therefore, the simulation 
development was a time consuming process due to ‘trial and error’ [sic] development method used, the lack of 
support and the taxing resource load imposed by EASEL on the operating system, this made testing and running 
of the simulations difficult due to the resource demand instability. Likewise, Marasea’s (2003) research utilised 
EASEL to develop a simulation model representing an attack upon the critical infrastructure that was developed 
and modelled in the EASEL environment, here again Marasea (2003) noted similar design, development, support 
and operational issues that impinged upon this research project too.
EASEL  is  not  particularly  conducive  to  rapid  model  development  or  systems  analysis  of  dynamic  and 
unbounded systems modelled utilising the EASEL environment. This is due in part to the long development lead 
time  necessary  to  develop  a  functional  simulation  and  that  the  user  support  for  EASEL was  and  remains 
essentially  no-existent.  The  issue  of  heavy computer  resource  use,  even  in  the  review of  these  previously 
functioning simulations, is still a major issue that more often than not leads to the computer devoting 100% 
resources to running the EASEL software, to the extent that the simulation program cannot load and run.
EASEL  presents  one  alternative  to  the  question  of  modelling  critical  infrastructures,  however  the  time 
consuming model development and the lack of ongoing development of the EASEL software package itself, has 
now ceased with no likelihood of resumption in the near future (SEI 2006). Although, there is still a need to 
model  critical  infrastructure systems quickly so that  important  analysis of  the system can be undertaken to 
identify normal operation, vulnerabilities and the effect of adverse incidents upon normal functionality.
Stock and Flow Diagrams 
A form a dynamic system modelling that is growing in popularity within business particularly is the Stock and 
Flow diagram whose notation consists of three of three different types of elements, namely, stocks, flows and 
information. The three elements together in a diagram graphically represent any dynamic process that may be 
apparent in any business and therefore can be utilised to establish and study the characteristics of such processes 
and illustrates the relationship among variables which have the potential to change over time (Kirkwood 2005).
Kirkwood (2005) illustrates in Figure 1 a very simple stock and flow diagram with the three elements Potential 
Customers, sales and Actual Customers and models the structure of the business process in regard to the rate at 
which Potential Customers reduces to zero. 
Figure 1 Stock and Flow Diagram
The  two  different  types  of  variables  illustrated  inside  the  rectangles  are  variables  called  a  stock,  level  or 
accumulation. The variable sales is shown next to the ‘butterfly valve’ or ‘bow tie’ [sic] symbol and this type of 
variable is known as a flow or rate, thus the two lines through the butterfly valve looks like a pipe with the valve 
controlling the flow. The premise here is that the graphical depiction represents the flow of Potential Customers 
towards Actual Customers with the rate of flow controlled by the sales valve; this is the key idea behind the 
difference between stock and flow. Therefore, a stock represents an accumulation of something and a flow is the 
movement of something from one stock to another (Kirkwood 2005).
Potential
Customers
sales
Actual
Customers
The final element of the Figure 1 diagram is the information link represented as a curved arrow and this notation 
represents  that  the  value  of  Potential  Customers  influencing  the  value  of  sales.  Additionally,  and  of  equal 
importance is the lack of an information arrow from Actual Customers to sales, which illustrates that information 
regarding the value of Actual Customers has no influence over the value of sales (Kirkwood 2005). 
Hence the focus of the stock and flow diagram is to investigate the changes and analysis of how the elements and 
the structure of the process can bring about change and because the focus is on the elements that make up the 
process (sometimes likened to the components of the system) and how the performance of the process changes 
over time, this forms the basis for studying the dynamics of a system. 
This is only a simple representation within a defined process boundary of a simple process example of a stock 
and flow and the question remains that this type of modelling may not necessarily be suitable for representing 
critical infrastructure systems and their relationships. The issue of the scalability potential of stock and flow 
models can tend to become difficult to interpret due to the diagrams added complexity in depicting the logical 
interconnection, processes and dependency relationships of critical infrastructure systems. It appears that stock 
and flow diagrams may be useful to model specific system processes where the boundaries are clearly defined 
and strictly adhered to, but may not necessarily be well suited to modelling multiple interconnected and large 
critical infrastructure systems from a security analysis perspective.
Viable Systems Modelling 
The  Viable  System  Model  (VSM)  represents  a  framework  for  managing  the  security  of  large  multi-level 
organisational information systems as a means of detecting, checking and identifying threats and vulnerabilities 
as  they appear  and through local  sub-system monitoring that  can distinguish between threatening and non-
threatening behaviours and adjust the whole system as a consequence (Hutchinson & Warren 2002). 
From the research perspective of Hutchinson and Warren (2002), VSM provides a framework to manage the 
security of and normal function of organisational information systems that are cooperating together as a larger 
overall information system, to deliver ongoing system security that takes into consideration all levels of the 
system.
The  disruption  or  destruction  of  information  systems  can  cause  serious  loss  of  service  to  customers  and 
increasingly information systems are under threat from both internal and external sources and there is a need to 
establish a robust and dynamic response to protect information assets (Gokhal & Banks 2004). In view of the 
structure of critical infrastructures and their reliance upon information systems, there is obviously a need to 
establish ways to protect such systems and VSM may offer benefits here. 
However,  from the  perspective  of  modelling  the  activity  of  a  critical  infrastructure  system with a  view to 
analysing the  critical  infrastructure  system as a  whole,  its  internal  system components  and the dependency 
relationships between critical infrastructure systems, VSM may not be applicable due to the sheer scope and size. 
Therefore, while it may be applicable at the organisational level, the magnitude and scale of modelling critical 
infrastructure systems across the state or national level would be well beyond VSM’s capabilities.  
Coloured Petri Nets
As proposed in the research of Pye and Warren (2006a), Petri Nets offer a systematic method of modelling 
highly interconnected, cooperating networked systems in a scalable manner and is a means of depicting the 
logical connection based on the physical representation of the critical infrastructure systems modelled. 
Furthermore, the Petri Net model also enables an analysis of the physical and operational structure of the critical 
infrastructure  system to  be  analytically  scrutinised,  additionally  it  is  a  relatively  simple  task  to  develop  a 
software simulation of the critical infrastructure system to represent the normal functionality of the system and 
the normal functional relationships between cooperating critical infrastructures. From this perspective the Petri 
Net notation would in simple terms represent the following:
• Place - represents a particular infrastructure;
• Transition – is the exchange of services between cooperating infrastructures;
• Arcs – are the connections between infrastructures.
When a critical infrastructure system petri net model is developed and satisfactorily reflects normal functionality, 
then redeveloped Petri Net models could indicate, incorporate and represent potential threats implemented into a 
subsequent simulation for response observation. Thus the central focus of this research project is to enable the 
observation  and  mapping  of  the  potential  impact  upon the  critical  infrastructure  system/s  targeted  and  the 
associated  critical  infrastructures  via  their  dependency  relationships.  From  this  viewpoint  it  is  potentially 
possible to identify the likely outcomes of threats and vulnerabilities and simulate potential solution scenarios 
and responses  to such threats  and vulnerabilities,  in this way testing probable security solutions  within the 
simulated  computer  environment,  before  progressing  to  actual  implementation  in  the  physical  critical 
infrastructure system.
Petri  Net  modelling  offer  an  interesting  approach  to  modelling  critical  infrastructures  that  requires  deeper 
investigation, as it  takes into consideration the dynamic nature of the systems involved and the dependency 
relationships that exist between cooperating infrastructures as well as mapping service delivery or failure within 
the critical infrastructure system model.
MODELLING ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
Of the four systems modelling methods and applications discussed, they all address the modelling issue from 
their own perspective and are all potentially beneficial and useable from their specialised perspective for the 
analysis of security issues relating to critical infrastructure systems, however there is no one single solution. 
What is required is to choose the best fit modelling methodology or package to enable the effective modelling of 
critical  infrastructures,  their  dependency  relationships,  incorporate  systems  dynamics  and  enable  simulation 
development for security scenario testing, analysis and solution application.
While,  EASEL was specifically  designed to  model  unbounded and dynamic  systems  it  was found that  the 
simulation software was computer resource greedy and unstable, operating system specific (Apple only), still in 
the software development stage although this has now ceased, along with negligible user support. Perhaps the 
overriding issue was the extended design and development time needed to develop a model simulation, which 
means the timeframe required to develop solutions quickly makes EASEL impractical for this task. 
Stock and flow diagrams are currently very popular within the field of modelling dynamic systems and processes 
and while  model development is  quick, there is  no accompanying computer  simulation development that  is 
applicable directly from the model. Unfortunately, stock and flow diagrams are not very scalable in a practical 
sense as the diagrams do become unsuitably complex to be of any real value when dealing with the relationships 
between multiple processes within a system or representing external system influences. While it is given that 
there is a need to understand the modelling notation used, it does not necessarily translate well to the layman 
perspective  in  regard  to  understanding  the  system  being  modelled,  although  as  shown  in  Figure  1  it  is 
appropriate for modelling isolated processes for analysis.
VSM represents system modelling from the information security management perspective of an organisation and 
by it very nature requires close and trusting cooperation between the infrastructures exchanging services and 
VSM also  displays  a  highly  level  of  complexity  that  impacts  upon  the  security  management  coordination 
required. Unfortunately, the VSM security management framework is not a modelling tool for systems analysis 
from the critical infrastructure system perspective, although it would have a part to play in the management of 
systems by the critical infrastructure owners and operators.
Finally, Coloured Petri Nets offer a potential modelling instrument that is scalable and resembles the logical and 
physical  representation  of  the  system very  quickly  and  easily  and  also  has  the  added  benefit  of  enabling 
computer generated simulation directly off the initial model, depending on what modelling package you use. 
Much of petri net modelling research literature relates to process modelling because this form of modelling 
enables rapid model development and computer simulation development in very short timeframes. This feature 
would greatly assist in developing and testing solutions that are also easy to manipulate and change, additionally 
petri net modelling comes from a sound mathematical basis (graph theory) with established rules applicable to 
petri  net  modelling. The application of petri  net  modelling to critical  infrastructure systems’ modelling was 
applied in research previously undertaken by Pye and Warren (2005, 2006a) in regard to electricity generation 
and transmission infrastructures in isolation.
CONCLUSION
This research represents an advancement built upon the previous research undertaken by the authors relating to 
developing  a  petri  net  model  representing  chosen  critical  infrastructure  systems  and  the  modelling 
representations of selected parts of the critical infrastructure system in isolation. This research applied petri net 
modelling to  a  case  study to  illustrate  the interconnection and physical  dependency relationships  that  exist 
between associated infrastructures related to electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructures 
(Pye & Warren 2006a). 
Although this is  an initial  comparative analysis  undertaken here,  there  is  further and deeper analysis to be 
undertaken to benchmark the effectiveness and functionality of these modelling packages against  a security 
benchmarking framework in relation to modelling critical infrastructure. However, at this early stage, petri nets 
appear  to  provide  the  ‘best  fit’  [sic] or  at  least  the  most  potential  for  transference  to  modelling  critical 
infrastructure  systems as  discussed earlier.  Although,  further  research will  continue to more deeply test  the 
capability of petri nets as a tool for the effective modelling and computer simulation development of physical 
critical infrastructure systems. This research will now form the foundation of future doctoral research and is the 
current focus of deeper ongoing research investigation into the potential to model critical infrastructure systems 
and networks at the national level and also scale down to lower, local levels.
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